Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study

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Where does it hurt? How do you feel? The enormous number of questions a provider can ask reflects the many variables that are important for treating pain. Jennifer R. The authors discuss tests that look at reflexive responses to potentially harmful stimuli like too much pressure or excessive heat. The hind paw is the location best understood and most often stimulated for investigating these reflexes in animals.

Once the baseline is found, the researcher then induces an injury and the tests are performed again. In response to the injury, the threshold drops.

Game Theory 101 (#63): Incomplete Information

The successful treatment of this condition is one of the foremost foundations upon which all new pain relieving treatments are built upon. Finally, a treatment, such as a new drug or exercise therapy, is given and the tests are performed one last time. For example, a couple of decades ago, a class of compounds called NK1 receptor antagonists were found to be effective in rodents and hailed as a potential breakthrough in pain care.

Despite these sophisticated experiments, scientists still struggle with other components of pain in animals: beliefs and expectations. A solution to a bargaining problem means the determination of such a division. Examples of simple as well as more complex applications of bargaining theory to economic, political and social situations abound. Essentially, one may apply an axiomatic approach to bargaining problems, i. One may also apply a different approach to bargaining problems, called the dynamic or strategic approach, which involves the representation of a bargain as a non-cooperative game and the investigation of solutions from among the equilibria of the game.

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The midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution. Dominik Karos, Shiran Rachmilevitch. Anne van den Nouweland, Agnieszka Rusinowska. Self-enforcing cooperation via strategic investment. Herve Moulin, A. Seth, Bart Taub. Waiting for a haircut? A bargaining perspective on sovereign debt restructuring. Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: Theory and experiment. Working paper. Legislative Bargaining and Partisan Delegation. Common ranking and stability of overlapping coalitions.

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Characterizing NTU-bankruptcy rules using bargaining axioms. Bas Dietzenbacher, Hans Peters. Subgame perfect equilibria in majoritarian bargaining. Anne Van den Nouweland, Agnieszka Rusinowska.

A generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai—Smorodinsky bargaining solutions. Benoit Decerf and Martin Van der Linden. The Subgame Perfect Core. Parkash Chander and Myrna Wooders. Bargaining over entry with a compulsory license deadline: Price spillovers and surplus expansion. Eric W Bond and Kamal Saggi. Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists. Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn.

Concussions in American football

Coalitional Bargaining with Consistent Counterfactuals. Roberto Burguet and Ramon Caminal. Sayantan Ghosal, Marcus Miller. Francesca Flamini. Feasible sets, comparative risk aversion, and comparative uncertainty aversion in bargaining. Group Strategy-Proofness in Private good Economies. Bargaining in endogenous trading networks.


Farewell to the vultures? Argentine debt restructuring and bargaining theory. Marcus Miller, Sayantan Ghosal. A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games. Commitment in alternating offers bargaining. Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games. Volker Britz, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski. Selecting among acquitted defendants: procedural choice vs. Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F.

Costless delay in negotiations. Jean-Jacques Herings, Harold Houba. Random assignment: Redefining the serial rule. Anna Bogomolnaia. Bargaining with non-convexities. Coalitions and Networks. Procedural fairness and redistributive proportional tax. On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time.

Agnieszka Rusinowska, Ahmet Ozkardas. Ana Mauleon, Jose J. Sempere-Monerris, Vincent Vannetelbosch. On cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: Limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria. Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts. Stability of networks under level-k farsightedness. Herings, A. Mauleon, V. The equivalence between two-person symmetric games and decision problems. On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols.

Equilibrium delay and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinsk. Bargaining over a common conceptual space. Group strategy-proofness in private good economies without money: matching, division and house allocation.